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May-June, 1957
CASE COMMENTS
Constitutional Law-Equal Protection in Class Legislation-
Colorado Sunday Closing Statute Upheld
By THOMAS A. NELSON, JR.
Thomas A. Nelson, Jr. is a second year student at the University of
Denver College of Law, and a member of the DICTA staff.
Plaintiffs, automobile dealers, were precluded by a Colorado
statute' from selling automobiles on Sundays. Other businesses, in-
cluding filling stations, motor repair shops, auto accessory business-
es and farm machinery dealers were allowed to operate on Sundays.
Plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment that the statute violated
both the Colorado constitution's prohibition of "special laws"' and
the equal protection clause of the Federal Constitution's fourteenth
amendment.' The Colorado Supreme Court initially held the act
unconstitutional4 but on rehearing declared it constitutional. Mosko
v. Dunbar, 309 P.2d 581 (Colo. 1957).
Since judicial construction has given the federal equal protec-
tion clause the same meaning as the Colorado constitution's "spe-
cial laws" provision, consideration of one is necessarily considera-
tion of both. The Supreme Court of Colorado has considered the
issue of the constitutionality of Sunday closing laws several times
before. The previous cases, like the instant case, concerned legisla-
tion directed at particular segments of the business community
rather than all-inclusive Sunday closing laws. In Denver v. Bach,'
an 1899 case, the supreme court held an ordinance which prohibited
the sale of clothing on Sunday to be unconstitutional as class legis-
lation prohibited by the Colorado constitution. A similar question
arose several years later in McClelland v. Denver,6 dealing with an
ordinance which forbade barbering on Sundays. The high court in
this instance declared the ordinance constitutional. Two years later
Mergren v. Denver7 questioned the constitutionality of an ordinance
precluding Sunday operation of meat markets and grocery stores.
The supreme court, following the Bach case, found this ordinance to
be class legislation forbidden by the state constitution." Then, in a
1938 case,9 the Colorado court ruled on a Denver ordinance which
prohibited the sale of new and used automobiles on Sundays. The
ordinance was upheld against a contention that it was discrimina-
tory special or class legislation. It should be noted that the ordi-
nance upheld in 1938 was substantially identical to the statute in-
volved in the Mosko case.
'Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-20-1 to 3 (Supp. 1955).
:Colo. Const. art. 5, § 25 (1876).
U. S Const. amend. XIV. 1 1.
8 8 Colo. Bar Ass'n Adv. Sh. 16 (1956).
526 Colo. 530, 58 Pac. 1089 (1899).
636 Cola. 486, 86 Pac. 126 (1906).
, 46 Colo. 385, 104 Pac. 395 (1909).
8 Accord: Allen v. Colorado Springs, 101 Colo. 498, 75 P.2d 141 (1937) (invalidated similar ordi-
nance of Colorado Springs).
9 Rosenbaum v. Denver, 102 Colo. 530, 81 P.2d 760 (1938).
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The opinion in the instant case declared that the new and used
automobile business is a business separate and distinct from any
other business, and that the statute treats equally all within the
business. Thus the court found that the act afforded all auto deal-
ers the equal protection of the laws. In so holding, the Colorado
court adopted from its previous decisions the criterion that where
the legislature enacts a Sunday closing law applicable to a legiti-
mate occupation or business, it will be upheld if there is any reason-
able basis for distinguishing businesses affected from businesses
allowed to remain open. The court relied heavily on its finding that
the sale, ownership and use of automobiles have been the subjects
of numerous legislative enactments which have treated automobile
law as a separate and distinct category. In support of this finding
the court cited Gundaker Motors v. Gassert,10 a late 1956 New Jer-
sey case upholding a statute which outlawed the sale of automobiles
on Sundays, but allowed other businesses to remain open. In an
opinion by Chief Justice Vanderbilt, the New Jersey court had held
that the automobile business constitutes a "class" differing from
any other class, and since the statute treated persons within that
class fairiy and impartially, it did not violate the fourteenth amend-
ment. The courts of Nebraska" and Illinois"2 have upheld Sunday
closing laws for auto dealers. On the other hand, the Florida court
invalidated a general Sunday law which expressly exempted news-
papers, theatres, filling stations, restaurants, grocery and drug
stores, hotels, parking lots and transportation companies, but not
auto dealers and garages. 13 That classification was considered ar-
bitrary.
Those opposed to classification like that in the principal case
have objected that although the business regulated may differ fac-
tually from other businesses, mere factual difference should not be
the determinant. They argue that, in order to be held constitutional,
a classification must Dot only be reasonable and not arbitrary, but
must rest upon a difference having a fair and substantial relation
to the object of the legislation. This test was laid down by the Unit-
ed States Supreme Court in Old Dearborn Distributing Co. v. Sea-
gram Distillers Corp.14 In other words, the fact that all within a
business or occupation are included within the terms of an act
should not be enough to validate the act. The validity of classifica-
tion should be determined by considering the objective of the legis-
lation. For example, if the objective is to limit the number of hours
worked, the classification should be broad enough to bring within
10 127 A.2d 566 (N. J. 1956).
" Stewart Motor Co. v. Omaha, 120 Neb. 776, 235 N. W. 332 (1931).
Is Humphrey Cherolet Co. a. City of Evonston, 7 Ill. Bluebook 2d 402, 131 N. E.2d 70 (1955).
1O Henderson v. Antonacci, 62 So.2d 5 (Fla. 1952).
'299 U. S. 183 (1936).
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it every business and avocation in order to prevent any person or
business from exceeding the limitations. If the object is to protect
Sunday as a day of rest, the statute should preclude all from work-
ing on Sundays. Of course, in those jurisdictions which have enact-
ed all-inclusive Sunday laws, certain works of necessity and charity
have been exempted for practical reasons. 5
Unfortunately neither the state nor the federal courts have fol-
lowed the rationale of the Old Dearborn case. It is apparent from
the cases previously mentioned that the Colorado court has not ap-
plied this principle, 6 but instead has rested its decisions on whether
a classification has brought within the operation of the law those
whose businesses were reasonably distinguishable from the busi-
nesses of other outside the statute, and whether it has forbidden all
competitors to remain open. However, a well written dissent in the
instant case indicated that Mr. Justice Sutton may have recognized
the distinction in rationales.
1 7
Mr. Justice Holmes, in Patersone v. Pennsylvania," declared,
"(A) state may classify with reference to the evil to
be prevented, and . . . if the class discriminated against is
or reasonably might be considered to define those from
whom the evil mainly is to be feared, it properly is picked
out. A lack of abstract symmetry does not matter. The ques-
tion is a practical one, dependent upon experience .... It is
not enough to invalidate the law that others may do the
same thing and go unpunished, if, as a matter of fact, it is
found that the danger is characteristic of the class
named." 9
Mr. Justice Holmes' statement could be paraphrased to express
the reasoning of the Colorado court in the Mosko case, dealing with
the dangers which experience has shown to be particularly peculiar
to the automobile selling business so as to "mark the class." The
0 See, e. g., Ross v. State, 9 Ind. App. 35, 36 N. E. 167 (1894).
-6 See also, Smith Brooks Printing Co. v. Young, 103 Colo. 199, 35 P.2d 39 (1938); Rifle Potato
Growers v. Smith, 78 Colo. 171, 240 Pac. 937 (1925); Consumer's League v. Southern R. R. Co., 53
Colo. 54, 125 Poc. 577 (1912).
"7 309 P.2d at 597.
"232 U. S. 138 (1913).
"Id at 144. Cf. West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U. S. 379 (1937); Bayside Fish Flour Co.
v. Gentry, 299 U. S. 422 (1936); People v. Zimmerman, 278 U. S. 63 (1928).
MARSOLEK'S HARDWARE & APPLIANCE STORES
Complete stock of Radios, Sporting Goods, Garden Supplies
Hardware, Television Sets, Hi-Fi Phonographs and Records
Main Store - 2606 E. Colfax FR. 7-2764
Open Evenings and Sundays 10:30 A. M. to 4:30 P. M.
TV Service Center - 3539 E. Colfax DE. 3-1595
Lawn Mowers Sharpened and Repaired
Bring your Radio and TV to us for repair - 90-Day Guarantee
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United States Supreme Court has stated, in other cases, that a law
which hits the evil where it is most felt is not to be overthrown be-
cause there are other instances to which it might have applied.20
That Court has not passed upon the validity of Sunday closing laws
regulating automobile dealers. However, it upheld a Minnesota
statute which prohibited barbering on Sundays 21 and it appears
from prior decisions that the Court will uphold the kind of classifi-
cation inherent in auto dealer Sunday closing laws.
Related to the question whether Sunday closing laws are dis-
criminatory class legislation, is the question whether legislature en-
acting such laws are within their police power. Chief Justice Moore
raised this question in a dissent in the principal case.21 In any case
which involves class legislation, a consideration of whether the
legislature enacted the questioned statute in the interest of the pub-
lic health, welfare, safety and morals, is necessary. A law making
body has no power under the guise of police regulation to arbi-
trarily invade the personal rights and liberties of an individual
citizen.2 The Colorado Supreme Court, in the cases considered,
either expressly or impliedly held the enactment of Sunday closing
laws to be within the police power. That all-inclusive Sunday laws
are within the police power seems unquestionable, and, assuming
this, the argument that particular Sunday closing laws are void be-
cause of exceeding the police power is merely begging the question
of class legislation.
It is interesting to note that the Supreme Court of the United
States in 1834 declared it to be the practice of that Court not to hold
statutes unconstitutional by a bare majority.
2 4 Ohio, -2 Nebraska26
and North Dakota2 7 have constitutional provisions to the effect that
statutes cannot be declared unconstitutional by a bare majoriy de-
cision. The reasoning behind these provisions is particularly inter-
esting in regard to the instant case, in light of the initial holding by
a four to three decision that the statute was unconstitutional, and
the final holding, again four to three, that it was constitutional.
In Colorado as elsewhere a statute must be plainly, palpably
and beyond a reasonable doubt unconstitutional before a court may
invalidate it. 2t Can a statute which three out of seven judges con-
sider valid, be plainly, palpably and beyond a reasonable doubt un-
constitutional?
20 Pearson v. Probate Court, 308 U. S. 518 (1939); Silver v. Silver, 280 U. S. 117 (1929).
2 Petit v. Minnesota, 177 U. 5. 164 (1899).
="309 P.2d at 593.
" Chenoweth v. State Board, 57 Colo. 574, 141 Pac. 132 (1913).
"City of New York v. Miln, 11 U. S. (8 Pet.) 43 (1834).
'Ohio Const. art. 4, 2 (1912).
'Neb. Const. art. 5, 5 2 (1875).
'7 N. D. Const. art. 4, 5 89 (1918).
2"Eachus v. People, 124 Colo. 454, 238 P.2d 885 (1951); McClain v. People, 111 Colo. 271, 141
P.2d 685 (1943); People ex rel v. Barksdale, 104 Colo. 1, 87 P.2d 755 (1939); People ex rel v. Let-
ford, 102 Colo. 284, 76 P.2d 274 (1938).
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